The last decade has seen the emergence of set-theoretic methods in fault detection and identification mechanisms. These techniques are seen as restrictive and mathematically challenging due to the strict conditions (e.g. signal boundedness) imposed for reactivity to faults by means of set separation. The present paper aims at implementing such methods to a practical application proposed by a wind turbine benchmark setup. It is shown that strict boundedness conditions can be adjusted in order to obtain robust fault detection.
INTRODUCTION
In modern applications there are strict requirements on the stability and performance criteria. As a direct result malfunctions in actuators, sensors or other systems components might lead to unsatisfactory performance or even instability. There are safety-critical systems in which this behavior is not merely inconvenient but can become catastrophic (well known examples of malfunctioning in aircraft incidents are discussed in Montoya [1983] , Maciejowski and Jones [2003] ).
As a consequence, a great deal of effort was put into developing closed-loop systems which can tolerate faults, while maintaining desirable performance and stability properties - Zhang and Jiang [2008] . The solutions employed usually exhibit implementations of active fault tolerant control (FTC) schemes which react to a detected fault and reconfigures the control actions so that the stability and the performances are maintained. The controller will compensate for the impacts of the faults either by using a precomputed law - Zhang and Jiang [2001] or by synthesizing a new one on-line -Patton [1997] .
Any FTC scheme relies on two fundamental mechanisms, the fault detection and identification (FDI) and the reconfiguration control (RC) mechanism.
The present paper deals with a multi-sensor control scheme, as recently proposed in e.g., , Olaru et al. [2008] . It follows a robust approach in the sense that, under a series of starting assumptions, abrupt faults can be detected and hence the information provided to the RC mechanism leads always to a correct design of the control action. The main idea is to describe invariant sets under both healthy and faulty functioning and to analyze, on the run, the relative information with respect to these sets in order to detect a fault occurrence and subsequently, construct the control action.
To the best of the authors knowledge, this scheme is one of the very few existing multi-sensor control schemes that allows to guarantee, in a deterministic sense, closed loop stability in the presence of sensor faults -treated in a different context in Savkin and Evans [2002] .
In Odgaard et al. [2009] a benchmark model wind turbine was proposed for FDI testing. Throughout the paper a set of typical fault scenarios was proposed with the associated characteristics and a maximal detection window. In the current paper we will apply set membership techniques for the construction of robust FDI mechanisms. A series of adaptations will be discussed and the level to which the set theoretic methods can be implemented will be detailed. Notation: We denote the Minkowski addition as A ⊕ B = {a + b : a ∈ A and b ∈ B} and denote x h ,x −h as a future, respectively anterior value of the current state, x. If h = 1, we will use the short notations x + , x − . For a binary signal f with values in {0, 1} notationf denotes
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 a basic description of the model and the faults involved will be recalled together with a framework for set theoretic methods in Section 3. The FDI mechanism will be detailed for representative faults in Section 4 and the results will be integrated in the Simulink scheme provided by Odgaard et al. [2009] . Finally, some conclusions will be drawn in Section 5.
WINDTURBINE DETAILS
A wind turbine is an electro-mechanical device that exploits the wind energy by means of a blade system which converts it into mechanical energy through a rotating shaft. Further, a coupled generator converts it to electrical energy and delivers it to the electrical grid. Odgaard et al. [2009] describes a tri-blade horizontal axis turbine with a generator fully coupled to a converter and variable speed. The inputs and outputs linking the subsystems of the wind turbine The actuators interact with the system by pitching the blades and by modifying the rotational speed of the turbine relative to the wind speed. Redundant sensors will measure the pitch of the blades, the rotor and generator speeds. The controller itself is nonlinear, with 4 distinct zones of functioning (defined by the state of the turbine and the wind speed) with the emphasis being on power optimization and constant power production zones.
The stated goal in Odgaard et al. [2009] is to propose the tools (namely a Simulink benchmark for a windturbine) and a collection of faults for future implementations of FDI mechanisms under the given fault scenarios.
Due to space limitations, in the current paper we do not reproduce the models and we refer in the following to the notations presented in Odgaard et al. [2009] and in its accompanying Simulink model. We recall here only Table 1 which describes the types of faults and the physical subsystems affected (actuators, sensors or internal dynamics of the wind turbine). In the following section we give a short description of FDI mechanisms implemented through set membership testing, which, without being exhaustive, tries to explain the basic methodology and points to references where additional details are sought.
SET MEMBERSHIP TECHNIQUES
In contrast with classical methods of fault detection which employ stochastic techniques, we describe here a set theoretic approach, which under suitable assumptions, will guarantee exact fault detection.
Test membership techniques considered for a FDI mechanism were presented in a number of papers. The basic notions are described in Seron et al. [2008] while various improvements are discussed in e.g. Olaru et al. [2009] (recovery of previously failed sensors), Ocampo-Martínez et al.
[2008] (actuator faults), Stoican et al. [2010] (switched systems). The common denominator of all these schemes is the use of robust positively invariant (RPI) sets for fault detection. To this end, various RPI constructions can be employed. We mention ultimate bounds sets [Kofman et al., 2007] for their simplicity and set iterations, as in Kouramas et al. [2005] , Olaru et al. [2008] for minimal RPI (mRPI) set approximations.
In order to have fault detection one will have to construct a suitable residual signal -Blanke et al. [2006] , that is, a signal constructed from available information and sensible to fault occurrences. Normally used choices are the output of an observer estimating the state or the output of a sensor. Let us associate to a fault f i a residual r i which is dependent on the fault event:
(1)
The next step is to construct R H i , R F i the healthy/faulty sets which describe the region of possible values under healthy, respectively faulty functioning of the component affected by the fault: r
This will permit to reduce the FDI to a simple set membership testing (
Note that the success of this approach depends on the structure of the system, the bounds characterizing the noises and the area in the state space where the state of the system will reside. Assuming that all these preconditions are validated the sets describing the functioning do not intersect (see (3)) and the FDI mechanism will be robust.
FAULT DETECTION IMPLEMENTATIONS
The previous section sketched a framework for FDI under set theoretic methods. In here we will show how it can be adapted to the current wind turbine benchmark.
Most importantly we have to note that the model of the faults is incomplete or unknown, e.g., we may know that the fault in question manifests through a change in the gain matrix of some sensor, but we don't know the new numerical value. This means that we cannot construct directly the set(s) describing the faulty functioning and therefore we are not able to guarantee a priori the fault detection and isolation. However we can still characterize the healthy area of functioning and provide qualitative assessments of the functioning under fault.
Next, note that the noises are not bounded, but are Gaussian distributions and as such, they can theoretically achieve any finite value. To alleviate this, we propose choosing 3σ bounds (such that the probability of being inside them surpasses some given threshold 1 but in the same time preserves the sets nonconservativness.).
In previous works of the authors the detection was made in a single step, that is, the nature of the fault, the bound noises and reference offset allowed the detection of a fault in a single step. However, these assumptions may be too optimistic in a practical setting. In particular, the nature of the fault combined with the offset of the reference signal offer the most difficult challenges. As such, we employ here a horizon of measure in which the fault has to be detected. Note that the maximal values for this horizon were given, fault-wise, in Odgaard et al. [2009] .
Additionally, one must consider that some of the faults may superpose and affect the same subsystem. Consequently, each possible combination has to be taken into account and treated as a separate case.
The matrices and vectors describing various subsystems are not always explicitly given in Odgaard et al. [2009] or consistent with notations made throughout the Simulink blocks. As a matter of convenience we will index the variables with the name of value that we study at that moment.
In the rest of the section, representative examples for the faults presented in Odgaard et al. [2009] are detailed, passing through sensor, actuator and system faults. FDI mechanisms are implemented and their effectiveness is detailed.
Sensor faults
The type of faults affecting sensor outputs in this practical setting are classified as scaling value and fixed value faults. We will discuss the specific FDI mechanism proposed for each type of fault for an example in each category (a thorough description of the other cases would be redundant, only the minor differences, relative to the illustrated cases, will be detailed).
Scaling value
We start with the scaling error faults and as illustrative example we chose f 2 which affects sensor β 2,m2 measuring the pitch β 2 of the second blade of the tri-blade system. This signal is given as the output of the following dynamics:
x
1 Usual choices, for Gaussian distribution, are the band −3σ . . . 3σ with probability of 99%, or band −6σ . . . 6σ with probability of 99, 99%
where A β2 , B β2 and C β2 are the matrices describing the dynamics. x β2 and x + β2 describe the current, respectively successor state of the system 2 and β r and β 2f are the reference and feedback action, respectively.
The sensor output is given by:
where f 2 denotes the fault occurrence ("1"("0") for healthy (faulty) functioning), K is the scaling value under fault and η β2,m2 is the associated measuring noise.
Fault signal f 2 and sensor β 2,m2 are depicted in Figure 2 .
Fig. 2. Fault signal f 2 and sensor β 2,m2
We are now able to describe the feedback action
) as
(6) Introducing (6) in (4) we obtain
To the above dynamics we associate an auxiliary reference system
and a Luenberger observer 4 for obtaining an estimatex β2 of the state based on the output of sensor β 2,m2 :
where L β2 will be chosen such that matrix A β2 − L β2 C β2 is stable (assuming that the pair (A β2 , C β2 ) is observable).
We have now the prerequisites for choosing a residual signal r f2 :
2 The same conventions of notation will be made in the rest of the paper.
3 Here and in the rest of the paper, we use auxiliary reference systems in order to have an "expected" reference value. These values should not be confounded with the exogenous references provided by the controller. 4 Note that only part of the input is known, namely βr, and therefore the observer is constructed with a partial input.
Using (7) and (9) we obtain the dynamics of the estimation errorx β2 x β2 −x β2 :
We observe that choosing L β2 = −B β2 /2 we make the estimator dynamics fault independent, and that the numerical values of the matrices keep the dynamics stable. Consequently we may simplify (11) to:
We are now able to offer a dynamic relation to (10) as follows:
. (13) By applying the invariance results mentioned in Section 3 we have the tools to compute the residual set R H f2 (R F f2 ) corresponding to the healthy (faulty) functioning of sensor β 2,m2 . Since the scaling factor K is unknown, only the former can be computed. As such, any a priori analysis of the robustness based on a relation of form (3) is not possible. Moreover, depending on the reference values it may be that the steady state behavior of the residual under both healthy and faulty functioning makes the fault detection unverifiable after a sufficiently long period of time.
We are forced then to analyze the transitory behavior of the residual when it switches between healthy to faulty functioning.
For the numerical values found in Odgaard et al. [2009] , we obtain a healthy residual set (the bounds on noises η β2,m1 , η β2,m2 are empirically chosen (see footnote 1 on page 3)), as depicted in Figure 3 (a) . The values of the residual signal (10) are depicted in blue before the fault occurrence and in black afterward. Note that the fault acknowledgment (residual (10) no longer inside set R H f2 ) is not verified even after 50 sampling instants (already well in excess of the allowed window of detection of 10 samples). However, one can observe, as detailed in Figure 3 (b) that, after 10 time instants under faulty functioning, there is a sensible change in the residual's behavior. Consequently, the window of detection can be respected if one choses to acknowledge the fault as soon as a significant change to previous values is observed for (10).
The same arguments and procedures can be used for sensor ω g,m2 which measures the generator speed ω g and is affected by scaling value fault f 5 . The only remark is that, since ω g is a subcomponent of the composed system generator speed + rotor speed, a projection will have to be made in order to retrieve the information of interest.
Fixed value
For the fixed value fault the same set membership methods can be employed. However, due to the present fault simplicity, a more direct technique was preferred. Namely, a difference signal, whose output represents the difference of the sensor output in question at different moments of time, will be considered. Thus, the residual signal will be zero 5 whenever under faulty functioning and nonzero under healthy functioning.
We illustrate this technique for fault f 1 affecting sensor β 1,m1 which measures β 1 , the pitch of the first blade of the wind turbine. We will associate to this fault the residual signal
(14) which can be described as the output of the auxiliary difference system:
After one sample period, the fault will be detected by observing a zero value for residual (14). The same goes in the reverse, where a nonzero value will signify the switch to healthy functioning. In Figure 4 we depict the fault affected signal β 1,m1 together with the fault signal f 1 . Remark 2. Note that we can extend the system (15) to a longer interval difference and/or consider multiple differences.
The same considerations can be applied to the rest of the sensors affected by fixed values faults: ω r,m1 which measures the rotor speed and β 3,m1 which measures the pitch of the third blade. 
Actuator faults
The actuator faults encountered in the benchmark are f 8 which affects the generator torque and manifests itself through an additive offset and f 6 , f 7 which change the internal dynamics of the actuators regulating the pitch angle of second, respectively third blade.
Offset bias The generator torque dynamics are described by τ
can be associated. This permits to define the tracking error for the generator torque z τg τ g − τ g,ref :
Using information provided by the sensor τ g,m , measuring the torque, and (17), (18) we define the residual signal as:
Using the previous results we can now write the residual set associated to signal (19) under healthy functioning as R
where Z τg denotes the invariant set associated to dynamics (18) under healthy functioning (i.e. f 8 = 1, in this particular case Z τg = {0} since there are no noises in dynamics (18)) and N τg,m bounds the measuring noise η τg,m . For the sake of demonstration we take the value of the bias from the simulation and construct the faulty residual set R F f8 as follows:
For illustration we depict in Figure 5 which regulates the pitch angle of the second blade. Recall that the healthy behavior is described by dynamics (4) while the dynamics under fault f 6 are given by dynamics x
As a residual signal we can use (10) but in this case we run the risk of using a sensor, β 2,m2 , which itself may be affected by a fault, namely f 2 . As such, we prefer to use sensor β 2,m1 which is fault-free for constructing the residual signal r f6 :
wherex β2,m1 is the estimation obtained from an observer constructed similarly to (9). As illustration we depict in Figure 6 the residual r f6 against its healthy residual set R H f6 (constructed similarly to R H f2 ) and observe that in less than 10 time instants we can guarantee the fault occurence (r f6 / ∈ R H f6 ). The other fault which changes dynamics, f 7 , affects the actuator β 3 which regulates the pitch angle of the third blade. While similar with the previous case it differs by the fact that f 7 is no longer abrupt and consequently a longer window of detection is allowed (600 sampling periods).
Fault f 9 changes the dynamics of the drive train through increased friction. The differences between healthy and faulty functioning are extremely feeble and as such we don't deem practical or necessary to associate a FDI block to this fault.
Composite faults
Until now each fault was treated separately but this may not be always the case. Consider for example the sensor β 2,m2 which is affected by fault f 2 through a scaling value in the output but can be also indirectly affected by fault f 6 (it changes the dynamics of actuator β 2 which is measured by β 2,m2 ).
These simultaneous fault occurrences can affect the isolation part of the FDI mechanism by wrongly identifying the fault and, more importantly, by making the composite fault undetectable.
As a consequence, all situations of possible fault superposition have to be analyzed and managed. Take for example faults f 2 , f 6 and signal β 2 measured by β 2,m1 and β 2,m2 . Since sensor β 2,m1 is not affected by faults we can use it for detecting fault f 6 . On the other part, β 2,m2 can be affected simultaneously by f 2 and f 6 . By knowing when fault f 6 is triggered, the estimator (9) can be modified to take into account the change of dynamics which will give a new set of residual healthy/faulty sets, similarly to the ones defined in (10).
A similar case is represented by the pair of faults f 3 , f 7 which affect the pitch dynamics of the third blade, and the sensor measuring the pitch, respectively. The same reasonings can be applied by noting that we have access to sensor β 3,m2 which is affected only by fault f 3 .
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented FDI mechanisms based on set membership techniques adapted to realistic benchmark of a tri-blade wind turbine. We described the particular methods employed for each type of fault and, where was the case, we shown the limitations of the above techniques. Finally, a comprehensive fault scenario was applied to the scheme for the validation of the FDI block. The analysis is hindered by the fact that usually the amplitude of the fault is unknown, as such, a fault estimation mechanism would be most useful. Additionally, for a complete fault tolerant scheme, the influence of delayed detection of the fault over the global stability of the system has to be analyzed.
